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value of plaintiff's profit-sharing like account, and further failed 
to offset the marital liabilities in determining the value of the 
marital estate and its division* 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 30-2-10 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): Homestead 
rights — Custody of children. Neither the husband nor wife can remove 
the other or their children from the homestead with the consent of the 
other, unless the owner of the property shall in good faith provide 
another homestead suitable to the condition in life of the family; and 
if a husband or wife abandons his or her spouse, that spouse is 
entitled to the custody of the minor children, unless a court of 
competent jurisdiction shall otherwise direct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, order and decree in the 
District Court awarding defendant custody of the youngest child, Jamie 
Alexander, where plaintiff was awarded custody of the other three 
minor children issue of the marriage; plaintiff further appeals from 
the decision of the District Court respecting issues of property 
division and child support. 
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Disposition In The Lower Court 
The matter was tried to the court whereupon the trial court 
granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of cruel 
treatment by the defendant directed to not only the plaintiff but to 
the children as well, and upon the further ground that defendant had 
had an adulterous affair. The trial court then divided custody of the 
children between the parties, the youngest, Jamie Alexander, going to 
the defendant, and made a division of the property and assets of the 
marriage on the apparent basis of equal shares, with exceptions that 
plaintiff is here seeking relief from. The trial court awarded no 
alimony or child support for either party. 
Statement Of Facts 
This action involves proceedings for a divorce and other relief 
pertinent to such actions sought in the lower court by plaintiff after 
the plaintiff, three of the four minor children and the parties' home 
was abandoned by the defendant on or about the 18th day of July, 1984, 
attendant the defendant's adulterous affair with James Dvorak. The 
parties hereto had been married on the 2nd day of May, 1968 in Tucson, 
Arizona. During the course of the marriage the parties had born issue 
to them four children: Darla Rene Alexander, born October 5, 1968; 
Beverly Alexander, born February 20, 1970; Stephen Norris Alexander, 
Jr., born October 19, 1971; and Jamie Alexander, born November 14, 
1980. 
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During the course of the marriage the defendant treated plaintiff 
and the parties1 children cruelly (Transcript, page 133; hereinafter 
referred to as T. 133), indulged in extra-marital affairs (T. 11), was 
abusive toward the children and irresponsible. Sometime before the 
month of July 1984 the defendant developed a relationship with James 
Dvorak, which led to events such as the attendance of the defendant, 
with the children present, at a drive-in movie, during which the 
defendant sat closely to and in an apparent romantic posture towards 
James Dvorak. This relationship developed further to the point that on 
or about July 18th, 1984, the defendant deserted or abandoned the 
family home, three of the minor children and the plaintiff (T. 136; T. 
95) , to travel in conjunction with James Dvorak, who was at that time 
was also married (T. 76). During the course of defendant's travels 
with Mr. Dvorak the defendant and the parties' youngest child, Jamie, 
shared the same bed with Mr. Dvorak (T. 72); during trial on this 
matter the defendant denied sharing the same bed as described by Mr. 
Dvorak in his testimony (T. 95), but the court unequivocally was 
persuaded as to the accuracy of Mr. Dvorak's testimony versus that by 
the defendant (T. 135). 
Prior to the defendant's desertion in July of 1984 there had 
developed a crisis in the family attendant the oldest daughter's 
second suicide attempt, that attempt involving a self-inflicted 
gunshot wound to the head and consequent brain damage, and having 
taken place in March of 1984. In direct response to that tragic 
circumstance the entire family became involved in therapy; while that 
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therapy was primarily focused on the problems and needs of the oldest 
daughter, both p l a in t i f f and defendant were extensively involved in 
numerous sessions with Dr. David Earl Nilsson, a neuropsychologist 
(with extensive t ra ining and experience in areas relative to child 
psychology, as set forth in p la in t i f f ' s exhibit number 6 admitted into 
evidence, including having been Chief of Psychology a t Primary 
Children1 Medical Center, 1980-1982), and his associates (T. 44 - 55). 
During the course of therapy the defendant was informed of the 
nature of her oldest daughter 's in jur ies and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t 
i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n j u r i e s such as t h e d a u g h t e r ' s a r e 
characteristically "emotionally volat i le , impulsive, have a d i f f i c u l t 
time being ab le to manage s t r e s s , are much more anxious, often 
depressed." (T. 46) Notwithstanding her knowledge of these factors the 
defendant engaged in a course of conduct aggravating the s t r e s s , 
anxiety and insecuri ty of the oldest daughter by the aforementioned 
conduct at the drive-in and, more importantly, more dramatically, by 
deserting that daughter precisely when her needs were the greatest. 
That conduct was "extremely detrimental" to the welfare and health of 
that child. (T. 51) 
Overall , and the record amply bears t h i s out, not only in the 
private conversations the court carr ied on with each of the three 
o lde r chi ldren (T. 114-124), the testimony of the p l a in t i f f (T. 
11-13) , the tes t imony of Dr. Ni lsson (T. 44 - 55) , and t h e 
uncontroverted course of conduct in abandonment by defendant, the 
defendant engaged in a pattern of behavior evidencing ins tab i l i ty and 
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i r r e s p o n s i b i l t y t h a t r e s u l t e d in t h e abuse and mistreatment of a l l 
three of the o lder c h i l d r e n . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o , the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
testimony gave a t l eas t one instance of abuse directed to the youngest 
ch i ld , Jamie (T. 12) . 
The p a r t i e s had acquired various asse ts during the course of the 
marriage, including an in te res t in rea l property, the p a r t i e s ' home, 
loca ted a t 361 East 300 South, Bountiful, Utah. The p a r t i e s ' had also 
acquired various motor vehicles , items of personal property, household 
fu rn i sh ings and bank and r e t i r e m e n t a c c o u n t s . The t r i a l c o u r t 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t the a s s e t s of the marr iage had a t o t a l va lue of 
Seventy-three thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Nine D o l l a r s ($73,629.00) , 
which should be divided equally (Findings - Paragraph 13; hereinafter 
F. 13) . These assets included the following: Thi r teen Thousand Seven 
Hundred Ninety Dollars ($13,790.00) in savings derived from withdrawl 
from one of the p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o f i t - s h a r i n g l i k e a c c o u n t s and 
d e t e r m i n e d a s of J u l y 1984; Twenty Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Seventeen Do l l a r s ($24,317.00) remaining in p r o f i t - s h a r i n g l i k e 
r e t i r e m e n t accounts with no deduction for amounts contributed af ter 
J u l y , 1984 and no deduct ion for income tax o b l i g a t i o n s t h e r e o n ; 
Twenty-Four Thousand Dollars ($24,000.0ft) in home equity; and Eleven 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($11,500.00) in other personal p rope r ty 
inc lud ing household furnishings. The court ordered an equal divis ion 
of these asse ts and tha t p l a in t i f f pay the outstanding o b l i g a t i o n s of 
the marriage without c red i t or an offset therefore respecting divis ion 
of the a s s e t s . Excluding auto and home mortgage obl igat ions there 
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remained more than Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) in outstanding 
marital obligations. 
During the pendency of the divorce the defendant returned 
unannounced to Utah, in March 1985, removed the older children from 
school and en te red the p a r t i e s 1 home to remove various items 
therefrom. The older children refused to leave at that time with 
defendant. The youngest child continued to reside with defendant, 
although there was an unserved Order To Show Cause and Temporary Order 
giving p l a in t i f f custody t e m p o r a r i l y . (Record - pages 16-17; 
hereinafter R. 16-17) 
The matter was heard by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on the 
22nd day of Apri l , 1985, and immediately upon the conclusion of 
closing arguments the court made i t s ruling. After sane dispute and 
discussion pertaining to the court 's findings, as between counsel for 
the p a r t i e s , p l a i n t i f f submitted findings consistent with the 
transcript of the court 's ruling, and judgment was accordingly entered 
pursuant thereto on the 17th day of July, 1985. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In rendering a determination on the issue of custody the t r i a l 
court erred and abused i t s d i sc re t ion , f i r s t , in inappropriately 
g iv ing weight to a p re fe rence for the mother; s econd ly , in 
inappropriately dividing the chi ldren; and, thirdly, in reaching a 
decision not based on the best in t e res t of the youngest ch i ld . The 
cou r t ' s decision, in this regard, was blatantly inconsistent with i t s 
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own findings and in conflict with the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence; the trial court's decision constituted an action so 
flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion and should be 
reversed. 
The trial court further failed to appropriately consider and 
apply the provisions of Section 30-2-10 Utah Code Annotated; where the 
evidence and findings showed that there was an abandonment of the 
homestead the trial court should have invoked a presumption that 
custody was properly to be awarded to the non-deserting parent, the 
plaintiff. 
In rendering a decision regarding the division of marital assets 
the trial court ruled inconsistently, failing to give due credit, or 
an offset for, uncontroverted tax consequences and marital debts in 
excess of those for auto loan and home mortgage obligations; in doing 
so the trial court abused its discretion and the decree should be 
modified or remanded accordingly. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORTY TO THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN MAKING ITS 
CUSTODY DETERMINATION. 
A. The T r i a l Court Was Improperly Influenced By A Preference For 
The Mother. 
There a re , perhaps, few if any decision-making problems imposed 
on t r i a l judges t h a t are more d i f f i cu l t than decisions affecting the 
custody of c h i l d r e n , p a r t i c u l a r l y young c h i l d r e n of s o - c a l l e d 
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 tender-years . 1 1 The trend of recent decades, combining an unfortunate 
number of family d i s so lu t ions with increased emphasis on the equal 
s t a n d i n g of members of b o t h s e x e s , has f requen t ly t h r u s t t h i s 
d i f f i cu l t dileitnia into the cour ts , trying the pa t i ence and wisdom of 
even the most consc i en t i ous and fair-minded judges. The his tory of 
t h i s Court i s hardly devoid of custody disputes; on the con t r a ry , the 
numerous cases t h a t have reached t h i s Cour t , on t h i s i s s u e , have 
r e s u l t e d in an ex t ens ive legacy of case law o u t l i n i n g in q u i t e 
s p e c i f i c d e t a i l the g u i d e l i n e s , r u l e s of law and re la t ive lack of 
presumptions t h a t a re to guide the t r i a l judge in address ing and 
deciding custody disputes . The prevailing and unequivocal standard, as 
between n a t u r a l p a r e n t s , i s t h a t custody should be determined by 
p lac ing the h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y on the c h i l d r e n ' s welfare and b e s t 
i n t e r e s t s . See Mechan v. Mechan, 544 P. 2d 479 (Utah 1975): Bingham v. 
Bingham, 575 P.2d 703 (Utah 1978); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 
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326 (Utah 1982); Nilson v. Nilsony 652 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1982). 
Like a relatively calm sea where a tortuous undertow swirls 
beneath the otherwise innocuous appearing surface, the apparent 
simplicity of the "best interest" rule conceals the often turbulent 
complexity of issues, concerns, problems of proof and, finally, 
difficulties attendant appellate review, that complicate if not 
undermine the process of applying this "equitable in the highest 
degree" (Mechan, supra) determination. It has been long and often 
noted: 
No hard and fast rule with respect to what may be 
considered the best interests of a child can . . . be 
laid down to govern in a l l cases. Each case must be 
determined upon i t s own p e c u l i a r f a c t s and 
circumstances. Jones v. Moore, 213 P. 191, at 194 
(Utah 1923); cited in Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P. 2d 
88, at 90n (Utah 1982). 
The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t , desp i t e the purportedly unequivocal 
semantics and intent of the "best i n t e re s t " ru le (which has been 
refined and bolstered by a broad framework of case law regarding 
specific factors; see Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38, a t 41 
(Utah 1982) where most such factors, with ci tat ions, are enumerated) , 
has been the continued entrenchment of a practical preference strongly 
favoring the mother, which is a preference rarely articulated by t r i a l 
courts but frequently a r t i cu la ted by t r i a l experienced counse l , 
speaking frankly, in consul tat ions with c l i e n t s inquiring of the 
feasibili ty of the father seeking custody ( i t works both ways: mothers 
are assured and fathers are discouraged, regardless of the c h i l d ' s 
best in te res t s , unless there are easily proven and relatively extreme 
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circumstances). As a consequence even the father who goes to court in 
good faith, seeking custody because he sincerely believes that is in 
the child's best interest, confronts, as a matter of practice, the 
hurdle of a burden of persuasion tipped against him. 
The significance of this underlying preference surfaced in the 
case presently before the court, but not obviously so until the trial 
court was pressed for more specific findings regarding the court's 
decision on custody. (T. 139-140). The trial court stated, at T. 141, 
"Now, I haven't found the defendant to be an unfit mother ..." Again, 
at T. 142, the trial court further stated: 
I recognize that instability in the defendant's 
life. I'm not saying that it's such an instability 
that it creates her from being a fit parent to care 
for that one child, and of all the children to 
award to her, that's obviously to the Court the 
best division the Court can make. 
Setting aside for later argument the error of the trial court 
here in applying a "dividing" the children approach to determining 
custody, the above language, particularly when combined with other 
references to the "fitness" of the parties by the trial court (see 
addendum of transcript of the court's ruling), clearly illustrates the 
degree and extent to which the trial court had practically imposed the 
burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, the father, to convince the 
court not merely that he is the better custodian but that the mother 
could not adequately provide for the child, that the mother was 
virtually unfit for custody. 
This very real de facto preference for the mother is often 
ignored or reasoned around, its influence manifested though it is not 
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a r t i c u l a t e d . Those seeking appellate review of decisions believed to 
be so influenced are usually left to resor t ing to the argument tha t 
given the circumstances and the nature of evidence and testimony, i t 
is to be logically inferred that a preference for the mother must have 
influenced the cour t even though t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n was not 
a r t i c u l a t e d . Such arguments are hardly persuasive in the absence of 
substantial and direct support from the record. See Nilson v. Nilsony 
652 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1982). The unfortunate consequence, however, as 
is plainly evident in the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling in t h i s case, tha t 
p re fe rence for the mother continues to bear strong influence, 
rendering decisions inconsistent with the equal protection guarantees 
of the federal and s t a t e consti tutions, decisions inconsistent with 
s tatutory and case law, and decisions inconsis tent with the best 
i n t e r e s t s of our chi ldren . Only when informed legal counsel can 
confidently advise, and divorcing parents can know, tha t the courts 
wi l l in fact award custody pursuant to the children's best interest , 
only then w i l l the l e g a l system be assured t h a t i t i s b e s t 
f a c i l i t a t i n g the appropriate decision-making process among that vast 
majority of d ivorc ing p a r e n t s who dec ide between themselves 
(theoretically subject to judicial review) the custody arrangements of 
their children. The effects of the preference, unchecked upon judicial 
review, range far beyond the relatively few custody decisions rendered 
by judges after l i t igat ion. 
I t i s here submitted tha t the continued entrenchment of th i s , 
uusually non-art iculated p re fe rence , i s assured by the s t r i c t 
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application of the current standard of review in custody matters: 
Only where the trial court action is so flagrantly 
unjust at to constitute an abuse of discretion 
should the appellate forum interpose its own 
judgment. Jorgensen v. Jorgenseny 599 P. 2d 510, at 
512 (Utah 1979). 
That standard of review is clearly appropriate in cases where the 
trial court clearly applied the appropriate guidelines and rules in 
exercising its discretion on the issue of custody. Absent a record 
that clearly indicates the application of the proper guidelines and 
rules by the trial court, however, the reviewing court should invoke a 
standard of review that more closely scrutinizes the basis for the 
trial court's decision. Where it appears upon such review that the 
trial court materially or substantially deviated from the standard of 
"in the best interests of the child" rule, then the reviewing court, 
this Court, should invoke its own decision based on the record (it is 
equity review) or remand, depending on the particular facts of record 
in individual cases. It is, on the other hand, patently unjust to 
children and parents to allow custody determinations not clearly based 
on the child's best interest to stand absent a showing of "action so 
flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion." 
The other side of this argument is compellingly simple: making a 
custody determination not based on giving the highest priority to the 
child's best interests is, on its face, an abuse of discretion, even 
if the facts of the particular case do not render that action 
"flagrantly unjust." The underlying concept here has been noted 
previously by this Court in finding an abuse of discretion: 
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Fai lure to consider p e r t i n e n t f a c t s makes i t 
impossible for the t r i a l court to exercise a fully 
informed discretion. Kallas v. Kal las , 614 P. 2d 
641, at 646 (Utah 1980). 
In the case here pending the language of the trial court's ruling 
and findings is replete with references to "fitness," and other terms 
referring to the parties' abilities to adequately care for the child. 
Nowhere does the trial court even invoke or speak of the "best 
interest" of the child standard. Pressed for specific findings the 
trial court states: 
There's been nothing before the Court to show 
there 's any lack of care for tha t ch i ld . There's 
been nothing to show she has not properly cared for 
t h a t c h i l d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of t ime of 
approximately , not q u i t e , near n ine months, 
whatever i t ' s been since she left with that child. 
There's some instabil i ty, and for that purpose, 
s h e ' s , you know, she ' s l o s t the custody of three 
children, (emphasis added) (T. 140) 
Even a cursory review of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling exposes the 
nature of the burden the father, the plaintiff, had in 'this case; the 
p rac t i ca l burden of persuasion imposed on the p l a i n t i f f was to 
convincingly show that the mother deserved to lose custody. In this 
regard the t r i a l court 's comment as to why she " los t " custody of the 
older three i s not on point: the evidence overwhelmingly showed that 
defendant deserted those chi ldren , abandoned cus tody , and t h a t 
defendant un i l a t e r a l l y removed the youngest from her home, from her 
siblings and from her father (the transcript is replete with evidence 
of t h i s conduct, and defendant admits to i t at T. 95). Perhaps, upon 
an objective review, maybe the defendant did deserve to lose custody 
of her children, including the youngest; counsel for plaintiff did not 
14 
present such a case to the trial court or argue such a point to the 
trial court (T. 125-128), and does not argue it here; that issue is 
and was inappropriate. The trial court erred in this regard and abused 
its discretion. 
B. The Trial Court Inappropriately Divided The Children. 
Several aspects of the argument set forth above apply with like 
force here. Againf the language of the court's ruling indicates that 
the court was inappropriately influenced by factors other than the 
best interest of the youngest child in deciding that custody of that 
child should go to the mother/ the defendant. The trial court stated: 
"...of all the children to award to herf that's obviously to the Court 
the best division the Court can make." (emphasis added; T. 142) While 
it may be unfair to characterize a trial court's basis for a decision 
upon the quote of a single statement/ in the case here before this 
Court counsel specifically requested specific findings as to the 
court's reasons in making the custody decision (T. 139-140)and in 
responding to that request the trial court does not even mention the 
testimony of Dr. Nilsson (see T. 54-55/ where Dr. Nilsson 
unequivocally recommends that the plaintiff is the better custodian 
for all four children), seems to overlook the testimony by James 
Dvorak about Jamie sharing the same bed as he and the defendant for a 
period of weeks (T. 72)
 f finds that the defendant is not an unfit 
person to have custody of Jamie and therefore awards the defendant 
custody, as the "best division" the court could make. 
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Although the trial court enjoys broad discretion in custody 
matters, that discretion is not so broad that the trial court can 
apply such standards as it chooses. Again, as in the above argument, 
it is here submitted that the trial court failed to apply the 
appropriate guidelines in deciding custody and therefore, as a matter 
of law, the court abused its discretion, and its decision should be 
replaced by that of this Court. 
C. The Evidence Overwhelmingly Preponderates In Favor Of A 
Finding That The Plaintiff Is The Proper Person To Be Awarded Custody 
Of The Youngest Child, Jamie. 
Where, as in this case, the trial court has abused its discretion 
by considering inappropriate factors, as set forth in A. and B. above, 
this Court should review the record and render a decision based upon a 
preponderance of the evidence. The record and evidence in this case is 
more fully argued below, in Point III, and that argument is 
incorporated herein as if fully set forth. It is here respectfully 
submitted that the record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff, and 
not defendant, should be awarded custody of the youngest child, Jamie 
Alexander. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
 f AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, IN AWARDING DEFENDANT CUSTODY OF 
JAMIE WHERE THE COURT FOUND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT ABANDONED THE PLAINTIFF, THE 
PARTIES' HOME AND THE OTHER CHILDREN. 
Section 30-2-10 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) provides, 
in pertinent part: 
...if a husband or wife abandons his or her spouse, 
that spouse is entitled to the custody of the minor 
children, unless a court of competent jurisdiction 
shall otherwise direct, (emphasis added> 
In the case here pending the court stated in its ruling, "The 
Court does look at the trip, that you left as basically abandoning the 
family ..." (T. 136). That finding is consistent with the 
uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff, Dr. Nilsson, and James 
Dvorak, and with the admissions of the defendant (T. 95; Pi. Exhibits 
7 and 8). Notwithstanding that finding the court granted defendant 
custody of the youngest child, reasoning that "She took that child 
with her. She didn't abandon that child." (T. 140) 
First, the provisions cited, supra, are specifically invoked 
where one abandons the "spouse," and is not dependent on a finding of 
abandonment of the children involved. There is an obvious rationality 
behind this: abandonment of the children would be an act so flagrantly 
detrimental to the welfare and best interest of those children that, 
as a matter of law (and absent compelling circumstances to the 
contrary) , the non-deserting spouse would be the better custodian; no 
specific statute need address that situation. 
Secondly, the provisions cited, supra, constitute a statutory 
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recognition of the importance of a stable and continuing family unit, 
and the integral significance of the family home, the "homestead," to 
tha t un i t . I t i s a recognition that this is so important of a factor 
in providing a healthy and wholesome environment for the ra is ing of 
chi ldren, that the spouse that abandons the homestead has, per se, 
acted in a manner so detrimental to the welfare and in t e re s t of the 
children (again, absent compelling circumstances to the contrary), 
tha t the non-desert ing spouse , the spouse remaining with the 
homestead, is the better custodian. 
T h i r d l y , sa id p r o v i s i o n s , when a p p l i e d , should serve to 
discourage precise ly the i r responsible pa t t e rn of conduct t h a t 
occurred in t h i s case, to discourage spouses from deserting the home 
and such children they choose to abandon, taking with them only the 
chi ldren they choose and hope to retain custody of with l i t t l e regard 
for the welfare of the other children or the family unit . 
I t is respectfully submitted that in the absence of compelling 
c i rcumstances and s p e c i f i c f ind ings in t h a t regard, tha t the 
provisions cited, supra, create a strong presumption in favor of the 
non-deserting spouse respecting custody of a l l the minor children; 
that in the case here before the Court, the t r i a l cou r t ' s fa i lu re to 
apply these provisions appropriately constituted a flagrant abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed. 
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POINT I I I 
THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OVERWHELMINGLY 
PREPONDERATED IN FAVOR OF AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF CUSTODY OF JAMIE AND IT WAS 
A FLAGRANT ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ORDER 
OTHERWISE. 
A. The F i n d i n g s Of The T r i a l C o u r t Are I n c o n s i s t e n t W i t h A 
Finding That I t Was In The Best I n t e r e s t Of Jamie To Be Awarded To The 
Custody Of Defendant. 
Among t h e s t a t e m e n t s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t in r u l i n g on t h e case 
before i t , a r e t h e fo l lowing: 
That defendant has t r e a t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f c r u e l l y , 
c a u s i n g him t o s u f f e r g r e a t m e n t a l d i s t r e s s by 
l e a v i n g t h e home of t h e p a r t i e s . . . h a v i n g an 
a f f a i r with another man, and for c r u e l t r ea tment t o 
t h e c h i l d r e n , (emphasis added, T. 133) 
T h e r e f s no q u e s t i o n , t h a t a l l t h r e e of t he o lder 
c h i l d r e n have had some bad exper iences t h a t t h e y ' r e 
c laiming from you, Mrs. Alexander. Not d i s c i p l i n e , 
b u t b e a t i n g s , and as I award t h a t younger c h i l d t o 
y o u , i t ' s w i t h c o n c e r n t h a t t h e r e may b e a 
r e p t i t i o n of those t h i n g s , (enphasis added, T. 133) 
The C o u r t b e l i e v e s , Mrs . Alexander , t h a t t h e r e ' s 
been a g r e a t d e a l of i n s t a b i l i t y , (emphasis added , 
T. 134-135) 
The C o u r t d o e s look a t t he t r i p , t h a t you l e f t as 
b a s i c a l l y abandoning the family , not j u s t a m a r i t a l 
problem, (emphasis added, T. 136) 
T h e r e ' s some i n s t a b i l i t y , and f o r t h a t p u r p o s e , 
s h e ' s , you know, s h e ' s l o s t c u s t o d y of t h r e e 
c h i l d r e n . (T. 140) 
And though I f i n d — I ' m s a y i n g t h e r e ' s some 
i n s t a b i l i t y . I r e c o g n i z e t h a t i n s t a b i l i t y in the 
d e f e n d a n t ' s l i f e . . . of a l l t h e c h i l d r e n t o award 
t o h e r , t h a t ' s o b v i o u s l y t o t h e C o u r t t h e b e s t 
d i v i s i o n the Court can make. (T. 142) 
Those t h r e e o lde r c h i l d r e n do no t want t o l i v e with 
the defendant, even though all three of them 
expressed love for her. (T. 142) 
In contrast to the above, in responding to testimony by the 
defendant and by the man in whose apartment she resided at the time 
(see T. 87-88), Roger Carrender, as to the condition they purportedly 
found the parties' home in upon making an unannounced visit in March 
of 1985, the trial court stated: 
I'm aware, too, that I can't ignore that testimony, 
Mr. Alexander, that try like you would, you may not 
be maintaining the kind of cleanliness of a home 
that needs to be for raising the three children 
you've got. I recognize it's only your wife and her 
friend that have testified to those things. 
...if the home was as bad as it's been testified to 
on that day your wife went in on March 1985, then 
I'm assuming that was not a normal condition, 
(emphasis added, T. 134) 
Clearly the court considered that testimony suspect, otherwise 
the court wouldn't have said "if the home was as bad," and the court 
would not have assumed that that was not the normal condition. 
Furthermore, the trial court had ample opportunity to inquire of all 
three older children privately in chambers and chose not to inquire 
further into this area. 
Finally, the Court is directed to the trial court's findings, 
paragraphs 3,5,7 and 8. It is respectfully submitted that the award of 
custody of Jamie to the defendant is so inconsistent with the court's 
other findings as to constitute "flagrant injustice" and an "abuse of 
discretion" that should be reversed. 
B. The Evidence Of Record Overwhelmingly Preponderates In Favor 
Of Custody Being Awarded To Plaintiff. 
The evidence and testimony presented to the trial court 
demonstatively established the following: 
1. That the defendant was suffering from instability, evidenced 
not only by her conduct in abondoning the family and plaintiff, but 
also in the testimony of Dr. Nilsson. (T. 55) 
2. That the defendant had acted to the detriment of all three of 
the older children through cruel treatment (F. 3), beatings (T. 133; 
T. 114-123) and deserting those children in July 1984. 
3. That the defendant had acted immorally in the presence of all 
four children, engaging in a romantic involvement outside the marriage 
at the drive-in (T. 71-72; T. 50-51), and particularly in Jamie*s 
presence by sharing a bed with Mr. Dvorak during their travels. (T. 
134-135; T. 72-73) 
4. That the romantic and immoral entanglements the defendant 
involved herself in had direct and detrimental effects on the welfare 
of all four children: three were abandoned, the fourth and youngest 
was torn away from her siblings, her home and her father (evidence of 
this is repeated throughout the transcript and record). 
5. That the defendant had, in particular, knowingly and 
recklessly endangered the health and welfare of the oldest daughter 
whose injuries had left her particularly vulnerable (T. 46, 50-52, 
99) , by that pattern of conduct outlined above; and that such blatant 
disregard for the welfare of her oldest child further evidenced the 
degree of instability, impulsivity and poor judgment being exercised 
by the defendant. 
6. That plaintiff is employed, earning a good wage with good 
benefits (T. 18-28; R. 28-32), whereas the defendant made no showing 
of any income (R. 35), and therefore the plaintiff was clearly in a 
much better posture to provide, economically, for the needs of all the 
children. 
7. That the only expert testimony presented was that of Dr. 
Nilsson, who unequivocally recommended that the plaintiff be awarded 
custody of all four children. (T. 55). 
8. That Dr. Nilsson had extensive contact with all members of the 
family, including some 15-20 hour-long sessions involving the presence 
and participation of the defendant (T. 59-61, 98-99), and he is a 
well-qualified expert to render an opinion regarding custody matters 
(PI. Exhibit 6, T. 44-45, 55-57). 
9. That the plaintiff, Mr. Alexander, assumed the duties of a 
single parent of three at home, and affirmatively continued the 
family's as well as the oldest daughter's involvement in therapy (T. 
53-54), thereby endeavoring to continue a stable and relatively secure 
environment for the remaining family. 
10. That the behavior pattern of the defendant is one that is 
particularly detrimental to the welfare of the youngest child; Dr. 
Nilsson testified: 
From her impulsivity, her poor judgment, and events 
of the last nine months, I feel tha t tha t type of 
behav io r , t h a t type of impu l s iv i t y and poor 
judgment c r e a t e s a g r e a t dea l of s t r e s s on 
children, especially a very young child. 
I t ' s impor tant they have t h a t s t a b i l t y and 
consistency that appears to have been absent. (T. 
55). 
The evidence presented at t r i a l , most of i t uncontroverted, most 
of i t convincingly credible as evidenced by the other findings and 
statements of the court , overwhelmingly preponderated in favor of 
awarding plaintiff custody of a l l four children. Not only would such 
an order have kept the s ib l ings together , i t would have kept than 
together in the home and neighborhood they had resided in for many 
years . In contrast the t r i a l court rushed to make a decision, pushing 
counsel as to time (T. 67-69), and rather than pausing to allow 
p la in t i f f an opportunity to present rebuttal to defendant's closing 
argument the t r i a l court imnediately stated i t s ru l ing , rather than 
take the matter under advisement even if for only such period of time 
to consider the exhibits admitted into evidence. The l a t t e r included 
two l e t t e r s wri t ten by defendant (Exhibits 7 and 8) that were direct 
and demonstrative evidence of d e f e n d a n t ' s immature judgments, 
i n s t a b i l i t y , admissions against interest and statements conflicting 
with defendant's own testimony before the court. 
I t is here respectful ly submitted that the t r i a l court acted 
capr ic iously , abused i t s d iscre t ion and rendered a decision that 
constituted a flagrant in jus t ice , not only to p l a in t i f f but to the 
youngest ch i ld , Jamie, as well . That decsion should be reversed and 
the plaintiff awarded custody. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
TAKE ACCOUNT OF OFFSETS IN DIVIDING 
THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
At issue here are the following: the tax obligation cind post-July 
1984 contributions r e l a t ive to the prof i t -shar ing l ike stock ownership 
plans t h a t p l a i n t i f f could withdraw from only upon r e t i r e m e n t or 
termination, and those mari tal debts over and above auto loan and home 
mortgage obligat ions which p l a in t i f f was ordered to pay. In reference 
to the l a t t e r , f i r s t , p l a in t i f f does not contend t h a t the order t h a t 
he pay those o b l i g a t i o n s was an abuse of d i sc re t ion , only t ha t where 
such o b l i g a t i o n - s amount t o more t h a n Seven Thousand D o l l a r s 
($7,000.00) , as they do here (R. 29) and the court determines that the 
a s s e t s of the mari tal e s t a t e should be divided equally, then i t i s an 
abuse of d iscre t ion to not deduct or offset such amount from the value 
of the e s t a t e : c lear ly the e s t a t e ' s real value i s , as a p r a c t i c a l and 
economic f a c t , diminished by i t s debts . (The obvious example of the 
propriety of t h i s i s the universal ly accepted approach to cons ide r ing 
the contribution of real property holdings to the value of the e s t a t e : 
only the equity i s considered.) 
R e g a r d i n g t h e p r o f i t - s h a r i n g p l a n s , t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s 
uncontroverted testimony c lea r ly conveyed the na tu r e of t he se p lans 
and t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s b a s i s for a s se s s ing t h e i r c u r r e n t value a t 
Thirteen Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($13,900.00), ra ther than t h a t 
amount determined by the c o u r t : Twenty Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Seventeen Dollars ($24,317.00). (See T. 18-28; Pi. Exhibits 2 & 4) . 
There is no question that retirement and profit-sharing accounts 
acquired during the course of the marriage are assets of the marital 
estate; the difficulty arises in assessing the present value of an 
asset the parties have no right to make use of until the occurrence of 
sane future event (retirement or terminationy. Combined with the 
circumstance here, that the value of said plans flucuated with stock 
prices and , consequently, with market conditions, any assessment of 
the value is inherently speculative. Since such plans have sane value 
and since that value should be considered in dividing up the marital 
estate, the trial court must make that decision based on the best 
evidence of value available. The least speculative approach is to 
assume present retirement or termination, and assess the resulting 
value to the estate; such event, however, would clearly be a taxable 
event, resulting in a present tax obligation pursuant to current tax 
provisions. The real value of the plan would be the net value after it 
is diminished by the tax obligation. It is inconsistent and illogical 
to assess the current value of such plan without considering the 
current tax consequences. There is, afterall, nothing so certain as 
death and taxes. 
In reference to whether the trial court should have considered 
post separation contributions, plaintiff does not take exception to 
the general rule and the holdings of this Court in Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P. 2d 326, at 328 (Utah 1980) , and Hamilton v. 
Hamilton, 562 P. 2d 235 (Utah 1977), but rather submits that that rule 
is not inflexible and that the provisions of Section 30-3-5 Utah Code 
Annotated do not specifically provide that the marital estate be 
divided per its value at the time the marriage is terminated, only 
that the determination as to the equitable division be made at that 
time. The obvious exception to the general rule would arise where 
there had been a separation of years prior to the actual termination 
of the marriage, during which one spouse worked and saved diligently 
while the other did quite the opposite; it would certainly be an abuse 
of discretion, in that event and absent specific reasons to the 
contrary, to require the thrifty spouse to assume some of the debts of 
the other and at the same time divide the value of that spouse's 
savings. Likewise, where one spouse deserts, abandons the home and 
family, it would be unjust and an abuse of discretion to award that 
deserting spouse a portion of subsequently hard-earned contributions 
even though they are acquired to the actual termination of the 
marriage. 
In this regard, the trial court did in fact determine the value 
of the liquidated account based on its value in July of 1984 (F. 13); 
and the trial court abused its discretion in not rendering a ruling on 
the unliquidated stock plans consistent therewith. The value of the 
marital estate, set by the trial court at Seventy Three Thousand Six 
Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($73,629.00) (F. 13) , should accordingly 
be reduced as follows: 
1. Five Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars ($5,790.00), 
representing the best evidence of the tax obligation on the 
unliquidated stock plan if i t was to be l iquidated a t present value. 
2 . F o u r T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ( $ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) a s t h e v a l u e of 
contributions added to tha t plan af ter July of 1984. ( P i . Exhibi t 2; 
T. 18-28). 
3 . Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) representing that amount of 
m a r i t a l debts over and above auto loan and home mortgage obl igat ions. 
(R 28-32). 
The to t a l amount p l a in t i f f i s seeking to have deducted from the 
m a r i t a l e s t a t e , before d i v i s i o n , i s Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred 
Ninety Dollars ($16,790.00), reducing the value of the e s t a t e to the 
sum of F i f t y Six Thousand E i g h t Hundred T h i r t y - N i n e Dol la r s 
($56,839.00). This matter should be remanded to the t r i a l cour t for 
such further proceedings as are appropriate in the pranises . 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully seeks an Order Of The Court reversing the 
trial court's dividing the custody of the children, and particularly 
seeks the awarding to plaintiff of custody of the youngest child issue 
of the marriage, Jamie Alexander. Plaintiff further seeks modification 
of the property division, and particularly that the defendant be 
awarded one half of a marital estate valued at Fifty-Six Thousand 
Eight Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars ($56,839.00) rather than the amount 
of Seventy-Three Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Nine Dollars. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of November, 1985. 
CJ~- if 
William H. Lindsley 
DIUMENTI, HARWARD & NELSON 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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A D D E N D U M 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DIUEOTI, HAPWPkRD & NELSON 
William H. Lindsley 
attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 34010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN NORRIS ALEXANDER, * 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS OF FACT AID 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAA7 
vs. * 
DIALS JEAN ALEXANDER, * Civil No. 35975 
Defendant. * 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on trie 
22nd day of April, 1935, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge presiding, with plaintiff present and represented 
by his counsel, William H. Lindsley, and defendanr appearing in person and 
represented by her counsel, James Hanks. The court having sworn witnesses, 
received testimony and evidence relating to the case and cifter consideration 
of the same, enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Davis County, 
State of Utah, and has been so for more than three months Limediately prior 
to the corrmencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband, having been 
married en the 2nd day of May, 1968 in Tucson, Arizona. 
3. During the course of the marriage defendant has treated 
plaint i f f cruelly, &al has treated his children cruelly resulting in extrerre 
emotional dis tress to plaint iff . 
4. Plaintiff ani defendant have had four children bom to the.r. as 
issue of t h i s irarriage, I>arl Rene Alexanier, bom October 5, 1963, 3everly 
Alexander, born February 20, 19^0, Stephen Norris Alexander, J r . born 
October 19, 1971 and Jattie Alexander, bom Ifovesrber 14, 1930. 
5. P l a i n t i f f should be awarded the sole care, custody anl control 
of the parties* three older children, Darl, Beverly and Stephen Uorris J r . . 
6. Defendant should i>2 awarded the custody of the p a r t i e s ' nrinor 
child, JaTie. 
7. The Court be l ieves that there i s sorre ins tabi l i ty on the part 
of the defendant. 
S. The Court b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e was a i i l l i c i t s e x u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between defendant and Jares Devorak during the t r i o in vriioh 
defendant abandoned the fa.Td.ly horre and iriesnbers of the fax i ly , except th~ 
youngest ch i ld and traveled out-of-state to Montana, then South Dakota and 
finally Missouri with Janes Devorak. 
9. Neither plaint i f f nor defendant should be awarded any SUT as 
and for child support. 
10. Neither p l a i n t i f f nor defendant snould be awarded any sirn as 
and for alimony. 
11. Plaintiff should be ordered to discharge the debts incurred by 
the part ies during their marriage. 
12. Each of the p a r t i e s should be ordered to discharge the debts 
they incurred subsequent to the separation an July 13, 1934. 
13. That the t o t a l a s se t s of the marriage are in the value of 
Seventy-Tnree Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Eight D o l l a r s ($73 ,623 .00} in 
v a l u e , which should be d i v i d e d e q u a l l y . These a s s e t s i n c l u d e : Tnir teen 
Thousand Seven Hundred n i n e t y D o l l a r s ($13 ,793 .00) i n s a v i n g s , v a l u e in 
J u l y , 10R4 w i t h deduc t ion for income tax ob l iga t ion ; Twenty Four Tnousani 
Three Hundred Seventeen Dollars ($24,317.00) i n r e t i r e m e n t p r o f i t s h a r i n g 
i n t e r e s t s with no deduction for amounts contr ibuted a f t e r July , 1934 and no 
deduction for income tax obl iga t ions thereon; Twenty Four Thousand D o l l a r s 
($24 ,000 .00) i n home e q u i t y ; and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred D o l l a r s 
($11#500.00) in other personal proper ty . Mo d e d u c t i o n male fo r o u t s t a n d n g 
debts of the ca r r i age . 
14. The personal propsr ty should be divided as follows: 
TO PIAIOTIFF: 
a. the van; and 
b . household f u r n i s h i n g s and remaining items of personal proper ty 
l e f t in the family home in Bountiful . 
TO DSFETKAOT: 
a. the t*o Ford automefoiies; and 
b . p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y p r e v i o u s l y removed by defendant from t h e 
family home in Bountiful . 
15. The remaining a s se t s of the marriage should divided as follows: 
a« p l a i n t i f f should be awarded the home and r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d 
a t 361 Eas t 300 South , Boun t i fu l , Utah and more p a r t i c u l a r l y described as 
follows: 
Beginning on the North l i n e of 3rd S t r ee t a t a 
point 163.5 feet Esat of the Southwest co rne r 
o f L o t 1, Block 1 3 , P l a t MAM, Boun t i fu l 
Totfisite Survey and running thenoe North O0!?' 
Eas t 170.5 f e e t more o r l e s s , t o t h e North 
l i n e of Lot 1, thence N ^°So% East 65.62 feet 
along t h e North l i n e of Lot I: thence South 
0 o 0 4 ' VJest 170.5 f e e t ; thenca Uorth 39°5&f 
West 65.62 feet to the point of beginning. 
subject to the provis ions se t for th in paragraph 16, below. 
b . defendant should be awarded t h e sirr of T n i r t y - S i x T'aousand 
Eight Hundred Fourteen Dollars (?36,314.00) as follows: One Thousand Dollars 
($1000.00) represent ing the value of the vehicles? Fi f teen Thousand D o l l a r s 
($15 ,000.00) i n lump sum cash and balance of Twenty Thousand n igh t Hundred 
Fourteen D o l l a r s ( $ 2 0 , 8 1 4 . 0 0 ) . Ho deduc t ion rrade fo r v a l u e of p e r s o n a l 
property reroved from the fairdly residence an the 14th day of March, 19-35. 
16 . P l a i n t i f f should be o r d e r e l t o p i y t h e b a l a n c e of Twenty 
Thousand Eight Hundred Four teen D o l l a r s ( $ 2 0 , 0 1 4 . 0 0 ) , secured by a l i e n 
a g a i n s t t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y more p a r t i c u l a r l y desc r ibed in paragrapn 15a, 
above, upon tha f i r s t occurance of any of the following: 
a. tine youngest chi ld in p l a i n t i f f ' s cus tody o b t a i n s t h e ago of 
majori ty; 
b . t h e c o h a b i t a t i o n of p l a i n t i f f w i t h a n o t h e r f e x a l o , o r 
rerrarriage; 
c . the s a l e of the pa r t i e s* heme; or 
d. p l a i n t i f f c e a s e s t o use t h e p a r t i e s ' home as h i s p r i n c i p a l 
place of res idence . 
17. The Court should r e t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as regards 
the Cour t ' s concerns regarding ch i ld custody. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now en te r s i t s : 
CJ?CLJ3ia35 OF IAW 
P l a i n t i f f should be awarded a Decree of Divorce fron*. defendant t o 
become f i n a l upon the d a t e of signing and entry here in . Said Decree sha l l 
include all of tiv» provisions mentioned in the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
Therefore lot judgront be enterel accordingly. 
DA.TZD this ffh day of 3 « i 1935. 
SY TIE COURT: 
JSi 
D0U3IA3 L. COFLiABY 
District Ju3ge 
APPROVED AS TO FORI: 
»Sf 
.\ttomey for Defendant 
TRANSCRIPT OF 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
(Pages 132-143 of trial transcript) 
1 spent from age 15 until now taking care of the children, 
2 that she be awarded a sum of alimony to get her on her 
3 feet again. I think it's not fair t o — y o u know—she has 
* devoted her life to those kids, and I know it's—she 
5 regrets having to leave also, but she has devoted her 
6 life to those kids, and she hasn't pursued a career as 
7 Steve has. 
8 Now he's set up. He has a profession. 
9 I ask the Court to award a reasonable sum of alimony. 
10 Your Honor, finally, I would just argue 
11 one more time that I feel in the best interest of the 
12 children, custody should be with their mother, and 
13 that's all I have. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 In ruling on this matter, the Court will 
16 make the following findings and decision: 
17 First, that the plaintiff was an actual 
18 and bonafide resident of Davis County at least three 
19 months prior to the filing of this action for divorce, 
20 having been filed on August 13, 1984; 
21 That plaintiff and defendant are husband 
22 and wife, having married on May 2nd, 1968, in Tucson, 
23 Arizona. 
24 Four children have been born issue of the 
25 marriage, Darla Alexander, born October 5, 1968; 
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Beverly Alexander, born February 20, 1970; Stephen Alexander 
Jr., born October 19, 1971; and Jamie Alexander born 
November 14, 1980. 
That the defendant has treated the 
plaintiff cruelly, causing him to suffer great mental 
distress by leaving the home of the parties, and doing 
that and having an affair with another man, and for 
cruel treatment to the children. For these reasons, 
the Court will grant a divorce to the plaintiff and 
against the defendant which may become final on entry. 
The plaintiff is awarded the care, custody, 
and control of the three older children, Darla, Beverly, 
and Steve; and the defendant is awarded custody of the 
fourth child, Jamie. 
And let me add to this that from the 
testimony given, neither is a perfect parent, but then 
none of us are perfect parents. There's no question, 
that all three of the older children have had some bad 
experiences that they're claiming from you, Mrs. Alexander. 
Not discipline, but beatings, and as I award that younger 
child to you, it's with concern that there may be a 
repitition of those things. 
If it ever becomes a matter, and children 
need discipline, but they do not need corporcil punishment, 
as it's called, using some force. That's not including 
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beating. Never does. And yet all three of the older 
children claim to have experienced that in talking to 
me privately, and I just make it a point. 
I'm aware, too, that I can't ignore the 
testimony, Mr. Alexander, that try like you would, you 
may not be maintaining the kind of cleanliness of a home 
that needs to be for raising the three children you've 
got. I recognize it's only your wife and her friends 
that have testified to those things. They say they're 
of a negative nature. 
If they're as bad as they testified to, 
there would be grounds for not allowing you to have 
custody of the three older children. But you're the 
only one that is a practical person to have custody of 
those three older children, and if the home was as bad 
as it's been testified to on the day that your wife went 
in on March 1985, then I'm assuming that was not a normal 
condition. 
And I say that for the same token, because 
if minimum standards of house care are not maintained, 
then these matters have to be brought back before the 
Court with an idea about doing something about custody, 
you see. 
I ought to say this: The Court believes, 
Mrs. Alexander, that there's been a great deal of 
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t instability. The Court does not believe in these long 
2 relationships that you've talked about on a platonic 
3 basis where you just associate. I do not believe week 
4 after week people sleep together in the same bed without 
5 a sexual relationship. I'm not that naive. 
6 I believe, just as it's been—the 
7 implications given to the Court, that it occurred. And 
8 if those kinds of things take place in the presence of 
9 a child, they're grounds also for having a child taken 
10 away from a person. 
11 I tell you these things because I've 
12 awarded children both ways in this case, and if the 
13 matter needs to be, tte Court always retains jurisdiction 
14 to bring the matters back in to be heard even if you're 
15 not living here and he's living in Davis County. 
16 Now, property—let me say about support 
17 of the children. I think that the plaintiff had not 
18 ought to be required to pay any support for the children 
19 that you have with you. I don't think you ought to be 
20 required to pay support to him because of the three 
21 children he has, taking into account, both of you have 
22 relative earning power. Not much has been said. Not 
23 much has been said with regard to alimony or your income. 
24 I gather you have about $200 a month income, maybe more. 
25 Nobody's said anything about it. 
135 
The Court does look at the trip, that 
you left as basically abandoning the family, not just 
a marital problem. When people have a marital problem, 
they consult a lawyer or consult their church counselor 
or get a psychologist or somebody to get counseling from. 
And then when they can't live together any more, they 
file for divorce and begin to work the hinges out. 
And when they're all through with it, 
if they're going back to live with the mother in Missouri, 
I don't object to that because that frequently happens. 
People go back to their own family to live with because 
that's the only way they can make it. That's not the 
kind of situation the Court views it as when you left. 
It was a matter of going to apparently Montana for some 
short period of time, a few weeks or whatever, and then 
over to South Dakato, and then on to Missouri. 
So it wasn't just a matter of going back 
there. And it wasn't just a matter of having to get 
out of the home, because you left with another man. And 
those are certainly considerations in the things the 
Court's doing in this case, and I go through these things 
because they're reasons for the Court not awarding any 
alimony in this case, and I'm not going to award any. 
Each party is going to pay their own 
attorney fee. 
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1 There's been a number of debts that were 
2 listed in the financial statement of plaintiff, and I'm 
3 going to require him to pay those debts. I'm going to 
4
 require each of you to pay the debts you might have 
5 incurred since the time of separation. In other words, 
6
 if you incurred any debts from the time you left back 
7
 in July, you'll have to pay those debts. 
8 For valuation purposes property wise, 
9 that's been a major problem with the parties and the 
to Court valuing the property in this manner. Retirement, 
11 and I'm talking now about those listed as one and two 
12 in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. I'm valuing those at $24,317, 
13 and do not believe there should be any amount taken off 
14 for future taxation. 
15 Value of the house at $24,000, as 
16
 stipulated by the parties. The Court's valuing the 
17 $21,000 that was drawn from savings at $13,790 which in 
18
 affect is allowing the plaintiff credit for the taxes 
19 that he's going to incur immediately because o f — 
20 recognize that amount was an estimate—but nevertheless, 
21 the Court's accepting it as the only evidence it has 
22
 before it as a reasonable basis on which to make this 
23 $13,790 valuation. 
2 4
 The value of the furniture at $7,500; the 
25
 Dodge Van at $1,500, which is the amount listed as what 
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1 was still owing on it. 
2 Each of the Fords—'73 Fords valued at 
3 $500; Travel Trailer at $1,000; the VW buggy at $500. 
4 While I've sat here, I've added it, and 
5 if I added it correctly, and I don't claim that it's 
6 correct, but it totals $73,629. And in fairness in 
7 this case, these parties for 17 years have been together 
8 and each ought to have one half of that value. One half 
9 value, that would be $36,814. 
10 The two Ford cars are awarded to the 
11 plaintiff, and counsel for the plaintiff has indicated 
12 there's about $15,000 available in that savings account 
13 to be paid if the Court—depending on how I made this 
14 division. I'm going to order that $15,000 to be paid 
15 to the defendant as a partial part of her share, and 
16 that would total $16,000. 
17 All the other property being awarded to 
18 the plaintiff. Then if I subtract that .from the $16,814 
19 for her half, it leaves $20,814 in what ought to be paid 
20 to her, and I'm going to direct that she—the house is 
21 awarded to the plaintiff, but that she's going to maintain 
22 a lien on that house in the amount—that amount, $20,814. 
23 It will be payable on the normal four 
24 circumstances that it's normally paid, that's if the 
25 plaintiff cohabits with somebody not his wife, or if he 
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1 remarries, or if he moves from the home, or it ceases 
2 to be the primary living place of the parties, or when 
3 the youngest child reaches 18. 
4
 Now, I think I've gone through everything* 
5 Any questions, Counsel? 
6 MR. HANKS: Now, you awarded $15,000 to 
7 Diane and also the car, or what made it $16,000? 
8 j THE COURT: Two cars. 
9 MR. HANKS: The two Fords? 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 MR. LINDSLEY: Did your Honor take into 
12 account the debts and subtracting them from the total 
13 value of the marriage? 
14 THE COURT: No, I didn't. I took that 
15 into account in deciding whether or not he ought to pay 
16 alimony. Normally with a 17-year marriage, in a situation 
17 like this, you'd probably expect the plaintiff to pay 
18 three or four or five hundred dollars a month alimony for 
19 a period of two or three years to help the other party 
20 get on some kind of equivalent buying power, and I 
21 haven't done that partially balancing out these equities 
22 between the parties, and partially because she chose to 
23 walk away from the marriage in the way she did. 
24 j Any other questions? 
MR. LINDSLEY: Yes. One other question, 
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25 
10 
1 your Honor. I'd like to know the particular finding 
2 that the Court finds in arriving at the decision that 
3 Jamie Alexander should be awarded to Mrs, Alexander. 
4 THE COURT: You mean besides what I've 
5 already said? 
6I MR. LINDSLEY: Well, your Honor, you've 
7 indicated that you believe there's instability and you 
3 believe she abandoned the marriage. You believe—. 
9 I THE COURT: She didn't abandon the children, 
She took that child with her. She didn't abandon that 
H I child. 
12 There's been nothing before the Court 
13 to show there's any lack of care for that child. There's 
14 been nothing to show she has not properly cared for that 
15 child during the period of time of approximately, not 
16 quite, near nine months, whatever it's been since she 
17 left with that child. 
18I There's some instability, and for that 
19 puspose, she's, you know, she's lost the custody of 
20 three children. 
21 ] And by the way, you recognize there's 
22 reasonable visitation privileges with each of the parents 
23 and their minor children, and anybody that exercises that 
24 visitation privilege is going to have to pay for the 
25 transportation cost of those visiting. And normally 
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1 visitation, of course, since you're in different states, 
2 normally we would ]?\it them a t about half-of-a-summer 
3 period. 
4
 But it would—what it means is that if 
5 the defendant had visitation with the children, they 
6 were going back to Missouri, she would have to pay the 
7 transportation cost back there. If the plaintiff has 
8 visitation privileges with Jamie for that period of 
9 time, he has to pay the transportation cost back here, 
10 both directions, I'm saying. 
11 Also, it's not unreasonable, of course, 
12 when you have these, if the parties want to, they can 
13 also have Christmas visitation, which, because of school-
14 ing, normally we would say from December 26th through 
15 January 1st. 
16 And so this can be part of the order, 
17 but again, the parties exercising it has to pay those 
18
 transportation costs. 
19 Now, I haven't found the defendant to be 
20 an unfit mother. I didn't say she was an unfit mother 
21 any more than I said the plaintiff was an unfit father, 
22 but I think that as between the two, I think you both 
23 have some problems in raising kids. Part of the plaintiff's 
24 problem is because he's spent most of his married life 
25 earning a living, not raising children. And though I find— 
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I'm saying there's some instability. I recognize that 
instability in the defendant's life, I'm not saying 
that it's such an instability that it creates her from 
being a fit parent to care for that one child, and of 
all the children to award to her, that's obviously to 
the Court the best division the Court can make. 
Those three older children do not want 
to live with the defendant, even though all three cf 
them expressed love for her. Apparently they don't get 
along with her. There's some factors in there, but 
is that enough or do you want some more? 
MR. LINDSLEY: Well, I take acception to 
it. 
THE COURT: Sure, you do. That's what 
lawyers are for. 
Anything else, though? 
MR. HANKS: One other thing. Regarding 
the furniture, your Honor, did you award—. 
THE COURT: I awarded it all to the 
plaintiff. That's why I went through this before I 
finished because I wanted to know, and they said, no, 
the plaintiff is taking all the furniture. And the only 
thing she's taking is a few little personal items that 
she wants. 
So that's the way the division is. If 
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you two want to divide that $7,500 further between you, 
that's perfectly all right with me, and you put a 
dollar value between the $7,500 value between the two 
of you. If you want to stay and do it, you can do it. 
Let me know what you agree on. 
Any questions? That's all. The court 
will be adjourned. 
MR. LINDSLEY: Should I draw the order, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 12:: 30 p.m., 
the proceedings came to a close.) 
143 1 
